felony offender and assessed punishment at forty-five years of imprisonment.
Bilnoski’s appellate counsel filed a brief that presents counsel’s professional
evaluation of the record and concludes the appeal is frivolous. See Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App.
Bilnoski filed a pro se
brief in response. The Court of Criminal Appeals has Continue reading
Based on his long history of mental health issues, he contends that the trial court
violated his due process rights by not conducting a formal evaluation of his
competency to stand trial. The trial court conducted an informal inquiry and found
him competent to stand trial. We affirm the conviction.
Underlying Facts and Procedural History
On May 1, 2008, George was indicted for aggravated assault. On or about June 9, 2008, George’s attorney requested a competency evaluation of George, and the trial court requested an evaluation. In July 2008, a psychiatrist diagnosed George with [s]chizophrenia – acute exacerbation[,] and concluded that George was not competent to stand trial. On August 18, 2008, the trial court concluded George was presently incompetent to stand trial and ordered him committed to the North Texas State Hospital–Vernon Campus (Vernon or Vernon facility) for further examination and treatment towards the specific objective of obtaining competency to stand trial. George received treatment at the Vernon facility. In a December 18, 2008 letter to the court, the chief psychiatrist at Vernon, which is part of the Texas Department of State Health Services, attached a competency evaluation stating that the psychiatrist diagnosed George with Bipolar I Disorder, Most Recent Episode Mixed, Severe with Psychotic Features[,] but determined that George was competent to stand trial. Thereafter, the Department requested that George be placed in the custody of the Jefferson County Sheriff and transported back to Jefferson County for further proceedings[.] The trial was set for January 12, 2009. Continue reading
TEX.HEALTH &SAFETY CODE ANN.§ 481.115(f) (West 2010). On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Antwine alleges that the detention was unduly prolonged, that he never consented to the search that led to the discovery of the cocaine following a routine traffic stop, and that the testimony of a State’s witness offered at the suppression hearing was incredible. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirm the judgment and conviction.
Deputy William Dykes was monitoring traffic on eastbound Interstate 30 shortly after midnight June 9, 2009, when he saw a car driven by Antwine pass by without proper illumination for the rear license plate. See
TEX. TRANSP.CODE ANN.§ 547.322(f) (West 2011). Dykes stated that, after he pulled Antwine over, he walked to the driver’s side window and talked to Antwine. According to Dykes, Antwine was very nervous and did not have a driver’s license; he did, however, tell Dykes his name and date of birth. Dykes returned to his car and called the dispatcher to check whether Antwine had a driver’s license and to check for warrants. He also called for assistance or backup, and Deputy Beau Radney responded within a few minutes. While speaking to Antwine, Radney smelled marihuana. Radney asked Antwine about the marihuana odor, and Antwine admitted having smoked a marihuana cigarette in the car earlier. He told Radney that there might be a roach in the ashtray. These statements led to a search of Antwine’s car and the discovery of 985 grams of cocaine. Continue reading
On April 8, 2013, pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, Antorr Lamar Allison was
sentenced to two years in prison, his sentence was suspended, and he was placed on community
supervision for two years. On July 31, 2013, the State filed a motion to revoke Allison’s
community supervision, alleging Allison had violated two conditions of his community
supervision. After a hearing, the trial court found that Allison had violated a condition of his Continue reading
A jury convicted Fernando Lopez of assault on a public servant and felony DWI. Lopez
presented evidence of his suitability for community supervision at the punishment phase of his
trial. The State then sought to question Lopez about whether he was subject to a hold by the U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE). The trial court permitted the questioning
over Lopez’s objection. The jury assessed Lopez’s punishment at two years’ imprisonment for the Continue reading
A jury convicted appellant Nico Allen-Antonio Cogdill of capital murder. The trial court
sentenced Cogdill to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, Cogdill
contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; and (2) the trial court erred in
refusing to admit into evidence certain testimony. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The evidence establishes Cogdill, whom the evidence suggested was a prospective member of the Aryan Brotherhood, spent an evening with Jeremy Bounce Bukowski, a member of the 04-13-00560-CRAryan Brotherhood, and Isaac Rooster Milne at a trailer house. The men talked about their past criminal exploits, including Cogdill’s history of thefts and burglaries. Eventually, Bukowski told Cogdill about a planned burglary that had been approved by Bukowski’s supervisor in the Aryan Brotherhood, Richard Ringley. The plan involved breaking into a trailer house owned by Rick Warren — a forty-nine-year-old invalid. Bukowski and his girlfriend had lived with Mr. Warren, but were asked to leave when Mr. Warren suspected they were stealing from him. Bukowski asked Cogdill if he would like to participate in the burglary and Cogdill agreed. According to Cogdill, Bukowski said no one would get hurt in the course of the burglary. Continue reading
After a bench trial, the trial court found appellant Christopher Bradley Young guilty
of evading detention with a vehicle, see Tex. Penal Code § 38.04, and, pursuant to the repeat
offender provision of the Penal Code, assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for five years, see id. § 12.42(a).
Appellant’s court-appointed attorney has filed a motion to withdraw supported by a
brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Continue reading
Gibson Donald Lewis was arrested for driving while intoxicated. See Tex. Penal Code
§ 49.04(a) (prohibiting operating a motor vehicle in a public place if individual is intoxicated);
see also id. § 49.01(2) (defining [i]ntoxicated). Subsequently, Lewis filed a motion to suppress
contending that his arrest was illegal. In response, the trial court convened a hearing regarding the
motion and ultimately denied the motion. Shortly after the trial court made its ruling, Lewis entered Continue reading
Appellant is represented by appointed counsel, Patti Sedita. Appellant’s brief
was originally due April 24, 2014. We granted a total of more than 90 days
extension of time to file appellant’s brief until August 25, 2014. When we granted
the last extension, we noted that no further extensions would be granted absent
exceptional circumstances. No brief was filed. On August 26, 2014, counsel filed a
further request for another 60 day-extension of time to file appellant’s brief. Continue reading
Appellant Jor’dan Jacqueinn Maurice Lewis appeals his conviction forcapital murder, which allegedly occurred when he was fourteen years old. In hisfirst two issues, appellant asserts the trial court erred in its submission ofaccomplice witness instructions to the jury. In his third issue, he challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence. And in his fourth through seventh issues, he contendsthat the imposition of his sentence–mandatory life in prison with a chance of
parole in forty years–violated several provisions of the United States and Texasconstitutions. We affirm. Continue reading
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2014).
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.31(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2014).
State did not establish that appellant robbed or attempted to rob the complainantReginald Williams; (2) appellant was denied due process because there is noevidence to support a finding that appellant robbed the complainant; (3) hismandatory punishment of life imprisonment without parole violates the UnitedStates and Texas Constitutions because it does not allow consideration ofmitigating evidence; and (4) the court costs should be deleted because the recorddoes not contain a proper bill of costs. We affirm. Continue reading
Richard Cartrell Haynes was charged with burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Penal
Code § 30.02(a) (prohibiting crime of burglary), (c)(2) (setting offense level for burglary of habitation).
After a trial, the jury found Haynes guilty of the charged offense. Subsequently, Haynes pleaded
true to 2 felony-enhancement allegations, and the district court imposed a sentence of 30 years’
imprisonment. See id.
§ 12.42 (elevating permissible punishment range for repeat-felony offenders). Continue reading
Appellant Ralph Ernest Alonso pleaded guilty to murder, a first-degree
felony, without an agreed recommendation as to punishment. See TEX.PENAL
CODE ANN. § 19.02(c) (West 2011). The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment
for 60 years. Alonso argues that the trial court should have granted him a new trial
because his sentence violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause and Continue reading
A jury convicted appellant Isaias Santos, III of capital murder, and the trial
court sentenced him to life in prison. See TEX.PENAL CODE ANN.§ 19.02(b)(1)
(West 2011); id. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2014). On appeal, Santos
challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that his
statement was obtained by threat. Because we conclude that the evidence Continue reading
Pursuant to a plea bargain, appellant Isaul Tavera pled guilty to the felony offense of
unlawful restraint in exchange for a suspended sentence and placement on community supervision.
See Tex. Penal Code § 20.02(a), (c)(2)(A); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 3. Subsequently, the
trial court granted the State’s motion to revoke community supervision and assessed
appellant’s punishment at three years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Continue reading