Craig Allen Ray appeals from his conviction for assault. In three issues, Appellant arguesthat he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

BACKGROUNDAppellant and his wife got into an argument on February 6, 2010. According to what shetold the police, he hit her in the face during the argument. Five days later, the police foundAppellant riding in a truck. The truck was stolen, and Appellant was later charged with theft and assault.As the grand jury alleged it in the indictment, the assault charge was a felony because theassault was on a family member and Appellant had a prior conviction for assaulting a familymember. 1 Appellant pleaded not guilty at his trial on the assault charge. The jury found himguilty as charged. Following a sentencing hearing, the jury imposed a sentence of imprisonmentfor ten years. This appeal followed. 1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A) (West 2011).

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In three issues, Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.Specifically, he asserts that counsel conducted an ineffective voir dire examination and allowedinadmissible evidence to be admitted. He also argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s poorperformance undermines confidence in the verdict. Applicable Law Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the two step analysisarticulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).The first step requires an appellant to demonstrate that trial counsel’s representation fell below anobjective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2065; McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Counsel’s representation is not reviewed for isolated or incidental deviations from professionalnorms, but on the basis of the totality of the representation. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104S. Ct. at 2069.The second step requires the appellant to show prejudice from the deficient performance ofhis attorney. See Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Hernandez v.State, 988 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). To establish prejudice, an appellant mustshow that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have beendifferent but for counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at2068; Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d at 900.We begin with the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range ofreasonable professional assistance. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). As part of this presumption, we presume counsel’s actions and decisions were reasonableand were motivated by sound trial strategy. See id. Appellant has the burden of provingineffective assistance of counsel. See id.In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2046-47, 80 L. Ed. 2d657 (1984), the United States Supreme Court recognized what is sometimes called a limitedexception to the Strickland analysis for situations where counsel entirely fails to subject theprosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing. The exception applies when there has beena denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptivelyunreliable. Id., 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S. Ct. at 2047. The Cronic standard applies, however,

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only when counsel’s failure to test the prosecutor’s case is complete. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.685, 696-97, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1851, 152 L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002). More often, the Cronic standard isnot properly invoked, but courts have found the failure of counsel to be complete in situationswhere counsel is physically present but mentally absent, see Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d743, 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), or in some instances where counsel abandons his client inclosing argument by conceding his guilt. See United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1511(10th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases in which closing statements admitting guilt on the only disputedfact issues was Cronic error); but see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190, 125 S. Ct. 551, 562,160 L. Ed. 2d 565 (2004) (concession of guilt as part of strategy in capital case where guilt wasclear not Cronic error). Analysis Appellant complains about his counsel’s specific conduct in four areas of the trial. Thefirst area is counsel’s conduct of the voir dire examination of prospective jurors. The trial courtjudge’s qualification of the jurors and comments to the jury were recorded in thirty-three pages ofthe reporter’s record. The prosecutor’s examination of the panel consumed eighty-eight pages ofthe reporter’s record. Appellant’s counsel’s questions took three pages to report. He asked theprospective jurors, rhetorically, if they now knew the definition of pain and described theprosecutor’s presentation as monotonous. He asked how many jurors were married, and thenasked just the men how many of them had found that the women are always right. Heconducted a very brief examination of one prospective juror and asked if there was [a]nyone elseout there from Lindale. He then delivered a soliloquy about disputes between husbands andwives and asked the jury panel to keep in mind that there were two sides to every story. After reiterating that point, and after the prosecutor objected to the first statement, counsel ended hisexamination of the panel.The second area is counsel’s handling of Appellant’s prior criminal history and anunrelated assault. Presumably in an attempt to establish that Appellant did not have a felonyconviction, which was necessary for him to be eligible for community supervision if convicted, 2
counsel asked an investigator if Appellant had been convicted of a felony offense. Theinvestigator responded that Appellant had not been convicted of a felony offense. The State 2 With exceptions not relevant here, to be eligible for community supervision in a case where the jury is toassess the sentence, a defendant must file a pretrial motion averring, and then prove at trial, that he does not have aprior felony conviction. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 4(e) (West Supp. 2011).

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responded by asking the investigator to list all of Appellant’s prior convictions. Counsel objectedto the investigator’s testifying about criminal cases that did not result in a conviction, but did notraise any other objections. The trial court made clear that it considered counsel to have openedthe door to Appellant’s prior convictions by asking if he had been convicted of a felony. Theinvestigator then listed Appellant’s prior convictions. Counsel also failed to object to testimonyby the complaining witness’s father that Appellant, when interrupted during an argument with thewitness, pointed a gun at him.The third area raised by Appellant is counsel’s failure to object to testimony about thecircumstances of his arrest. Appellant was not apprehended immediately after the assault. Hewas arrested five days later. When Appellant was arrested, he was the passenger in a stolen truck, and one of the other occupants of the truck had marihuana and methamphetamines on her person. Counsel did not object to the testimony that the truck was stolen or that another person in the truckhad illegal drugs.The fourth area is a transcript offered by the State during the sentencing hearing. Thetranscript was of an outburst by Appellant that occurred during the sentencing hearing while thejury was out of the courtroom. Appellant was unruly at different times during the trial, and thetrial court had excused the jury as Appellant began this particular outburst. Appellant made anumber of statements to the trial court including that they’re up in here violating mymotherf*cking rights that, referring to the judge, he didn’t want to hear nothing from yourmotherf*cking *ss neither [sic]; an exhortation to [l]ook how these folks are over there acting onthis godd*mn jury; and a description of the jury verdict as bullsh*t.The State had a transcript of these statements made and offered it into evidence. Appellant’s counsel did not object when it was offered, but he did object a short time later. In hisobjection, he stated that he had not read the exhibit and did not realize that it went intoeverything.Finally, Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s errors deprived him of hisright to counsel and to a fair trial. Voir Dire Examination of the Jury In Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 393-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), the court ofcriminal appeals listed a number of reasons that an attorney might decline to question a panel ofprospective jurors. The court recognized that counsel may not want to engage in an inquiry about

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sentencing because of the way such an inquiry might be taken by prospective jurors, that counselmay have been satisfied with the panel, or that counsel may even have sought to avoid giving thestate additional information on which to base its strikes. The court also recognized that, as here, itis difficult to evaluate counsel’s performance on direct appeal if the record does not disclose thereasons for counsel’s actions. Id. at 394.In Goodspeed, the defense attorney asked no questions. In this case, counsel didessentially the same thing. His voir dire technique was unlike that employed by most attorneys.However, counsel’s statements to the jury do reveal one of the reasons for his actions.Specifically, the State’s voir dire examination had been long and comprehensive. Presumably,the jury had been in the courthouse for a long time that day. Counsel stated that he was going to make this fast because he knew that the potential jurors were tired and worn out. By offering a folksy mien and, essentially, taking the jury’s side against a further waste of their time, counselsought to ingratiate himself with the jury.Appellant has not identified any juror characteristics that were missed by counsel. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 897 S.W.2d 361, 363-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (juror had undisclosedrelationship with prosecutor that court held should have been uncovered by counsel). Counselparticipated in a discussion about excusing jurors for cause, and it appears that he exercisedpreemptory strikes. In light of the court of criminal appeals’ decision in Goodspeed and becauseAppellant has not shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to ask a specific question orundertake a more comprehensive examination, we are unable to conclude that Appellant hasshown that he received ineffective assistance during the voir dire examination of potential jurors. Prior Criminal History and Unrelated Assault The State does not argue that there is an independent basis for the admission of Appellant’sprior criminal history, which consisted of misdemeanor offenses, or for the description of theassault on the complaining witness’s father. Instead, the State argues that counsel opened thedoor 3 to the admission of the prior criminal history and that an objection to the assault would havebeen futile because evidence of the assault had already been offered through the complainingwitness.Appellant does not show, or assert, that the trial court’s conclusion that counsel’s questions

See, e.g., Bowley v. State, 310 S.W.3d 431, 434-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (defendant opened door tootherwise inadmissible evidence by creating false impression).

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permitted the State to inquire about his prior criminal history was erroneous, but instead reliesupon the general rule that such evidence is inadmissible. See Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d891, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (To successfully assert that trial counsel’s failure to objectamounted to ineffective assistance, the applicant must show that the trial judge would havecommitted error in overruling such an objection.). Specifically, he argues that the evidence isirrelevant (Texas Rule of Evidence 401), more prejudicial than probative (Rule 403), andunavailable for impeachment (Rule 609). Accordingly, he argues, counsel was ineffective andrendered ineffective assistance when he did not raise these objections.We agree that a defendant’s prior criminal history is inadmissible, generally speaking, at atrial for an unrelated offense. However, the State did not seek to offer this evidence until counsel asked if Appellant had previously been convicted of a felony offense. The trial court made clear that it considered this to have opened the door and allowed the State to rebut the possiblesuggestion that Appellant did not have prior convictions for any crimes.Appellant has not shown that the trial court’s ruling, which was based upon counsel’shaving opened the door, was erroneous, and so he has not shown that an objection would havebeen helpful. Of course, Appellant also argues that counsel was ineffective for asking thequestion about whether he had a prior felony conviction. The procedural posture of this casefrustrates our review of this question. See, e.g., Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. Crim.App. 2002) (Under normal circumstances, the record on direct appeal will not be sufficient toshow that counsel’s representation was so deficient and so lacking in tactical or strategic decisionmaking as to overcome the presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable andprofessional.). It is certainly unusual to qualify a defendant for community supervision during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, but it is possible that counsel had some reason for doing it atthat time. Additionally, Appellant’s prior criminal history consisted of charges for less than themost serious of offenses. And the jury heard in the State’s case in chief that he had a priorconviction for assaulting the complaining witness in this case. It could be that counsel concludedthat it was worth showing that Appellant had not committed serious or infamous crimes. Becauseof the state of the record, we cannot know if counsel had these or other reasons for his actions.We must presume that his conduct was reasonable and professional, and we are unable to say thatno attorney would ever permit this kind of information to be admitted.In sum, Appellant has not shown that further objection would have been fruitful, because

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he has not shown that the trial court erred in concluding that counsel had opened the door, or thatcounsel grievously erred by opening the door to inquiry about his prior criminal history.Accordingly, we hold that Appellant has not shown that counsel’s handling of the issue of the priorcriminal history was unprofessional or that it deprived Appellant of his right to counsel.With respect to the assault on the complaining witness’s father, we agree with the State thatthere was little additional harm in counsel’s allowing the father to testify about the assault after thecomplaining witness had described it. Nor has Appellant shown that an objection to this evidencewould have been sustained. The State has not argued that it was otherwise admissible, but it isplain from the State’s questioning about the incident with the gun that it took the position thatAppellant’s counsel had first broached the subject. Indeed, Appellant’s counsel may have opened inquiry into the assault by asking the witness why she filed for divorce in 2001. He also asked her if their fights had been physical over the years and attempted to show that there was a mutuality tothe violence in their relationship. On redirect examination, the prosecutor began by referencingdefense counsel’s questioning about prior assaults and elicited her description of the 2001 assault.Because Appellant failed to show that the details of that assault were not relevant, especially oncehis counsel brought them up, he has not shown that an objection to the father’s testimony wouldhave been sustained or that counsel was ineffective. Circumstances of Arrest
It is difficult to discern a reason counsel would not have objected to the testimony thatAppellant was in a stolen truck when he was arrested or that another passenger had illegalnarcotics on her person. The State posits that because the trial court overruled counsel’s objectionto the playing of a videotape of the arrest, it would have been futile for counsel to object to the officer’s description of the arrest.But one of the purposes of an objection is to preserve an issue for appellate review,something that did not occur because counsel did not object to the officer’s description of thearrest. See, e.g., TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (issue not preserved for appellate review absentcontemporaneous objection). We recognize that the State may offer evidence regarding thecircumstances of an arrest. See, e.g., Maddox v. State, 682 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex. Crim. App.1985). So too can evidence of flight be admissible as an inference of guilt so long as it appearsthat the flight or escape has some relevance to the offense under prosecution. See Foster v. State,779 S.W.2d 845, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).

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The State argued at trial that the fact that the truck was stolen–Appellant admitted to thepolice that he stole the truck–was relevant because it showed that Appellant was trying to avoidthe police by travelling in a truck other than his own. Appellant does not address this issue. Theinference of flight is weak in this case, but it may be one on which reasonable minds could differ.The State does not argue that it was relevant that another passenger had illegal drugs in herpossession.Assuming, for purposes of argument, that counsel could have successfully prevented thejury from hearing that the truck was stolen and that another passenger had drugs, we are notpersuaded that Appellant has demonstrated prejudice. The complaining witness testified directlythat Appellant assaulted her. There were photographs of the injuries, a prompt report of the assault, and a contemporaneous police investigation. Furthermore, Appellant wrote letters to both his wife and to their daughter. In his letter to his wife, he apologized for put[ting] [his]hands on her in a harmful way. To his daughter, he made a similar apology for putting hishands on her mother. Additionally, a doctor who examined the complaining witness the nightof the assault testified that her injuries were consistent with trauma or a blow.In short, we are not persuaded that counsel’s failure to exclude the evidence that Appellantstole a truck or that one of his companions had drugs had an effect on the verdict. The evidencethat supports the verdict is strong, and our confidence is not undermined by what may have been anisolated failure to object. We overrule Appellant’s first issue. Punishment Evidence Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of atranscript of his statements made while the jury was excused from the trial. He also argues that counsel was ineffective because he agreed to have the transcript admitted without reading it. 4
The statements were inflammatory, but we are not persuaded, as Appellant argues, that thestatements were inadmissible. See Vaughn v. State, 931 S.W.2d 564, 566 (Tex. Crim. App.1996) (Appellant must show that it would have been error for the court to overrule an objection tothe admissibility of the evidence.); Matthews v. State, 960 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. App.Tyler1997, no pet.). Evidence may be offered at a punishment hearing as to

We note that while counsel stated that he had not read the transcript, he had been present when Appellantmade the statements.

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TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011).Appellant filed an application for community supervision. Accordingly, evidence of hiswillingness to comply with court orders is relevant to the issue of his suitability for communitysupervision. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 181 S.W.3d 760, 766 (Tex. App.Waco 2005, pet. ref’d)(citing Najar v. State, 74 S.W.3d 82, 87-88 (Tex. App.Waco 2002, pet. dism’d); Peters v. State, 31 S.W.3d 704, 719 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d)). Appellant’s inability toconform his demeanor to that commonly observed in a courtroom is relevant to his suitability forcommunity supervision, and so counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the transcriptthat contained Appellant’s outburst. We overrule Appellant’s second issue. Cumulative Effect of Trial Counsel’s Actions In his third issue, Appellant argues that the cumulative effect of counsel’s failuresprejudiced him. We disagree. Appellant did not suffer from a Cronic-type complete lack ofcounsel. We have identified one instance in which counsel erred. Specifically, the evidence thata person with Appellant when he was arrested had drugs was not relevant and could have beenexcluded. In addition, it is possible that counsel could have minimized the testimony about thestolen truck or had it excluded entirely as the State’s rationale for admitting it was weak and thetrial court may have sustained an objection pursuant to Rule 403 or simply as a matter of caution. Appellant has identified other areas where counsel could have taken a different course.For example, most attorneys would have conducted a more thorough voir dire examination. Andmany attorneys would have objected, even if unsuccessfully, to references to the other assaultsAppellant committed, to the evidence of his outburst being admitted during the punishmenthearing, and to testimony about the stolen truck. However, the Strickland test does not askwhether counsel performed within the narrow range of common experience. Indeed, what couldbe considered counsel’s seeming nonchalance about the evidence admitted can also be understoodas a nonreckless, nothing-to-hide attempt to obtain a favorable outcome for a defendant who hadassaulted his wife and had written two notes apologizing for doing so. As a contrasting example

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of attorney tactics, in Hall v. State, No. 12-07-00478-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4954, at *14-17(Tex. App.Tyler June 30 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication), we consideredan attorney who took an antagonistic approach to the trial, who asked questions after objectionshad been sustained, and who made aggressive arguments about perceived flaws in the policeinvestigation. In that case, we looked to the Supreme Court case of Yarborough v. Gentry, 540U.S. 1, 10-11, 124 S. Ct. 1, 6-7, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003). In Yarborough, the defense attorney hadreferred to his client as a bad person, lousy drug addict, stinking thief, [and a] jailbird . . . . TheCourt, while noting that the lawyer was no Aristotle or even Clarence Darrow, held that counseldid not render ineffective assistance because such a course of action is precisely the sort ofcalculated risk that lies at the heart of an advocate’s discretion. Neither the approach in Yarborough nor the approach here is a quotidian or textbook criminal defense. But they are strategic choices and calculated risks made by counsel, in this casecounsel hired by Appellant, in an attempt to obtain a favorable outcome. This is not one of therare cases in which a silent record as to counsel’s reasoning allows us, nevertheless, to concludethat counsel’s actions fell below professional norms or that Appellant, given the evidence againsthim, was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. See Robinson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 808, 813 n.7 (Tex.Crim. App. 2000). We overrule Appellant’s third issue.

DISPOSITIONHaving overruled Appellant’s three issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

SAM GRIFFITH Justice

Opinion delivered February 29, 2012. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.

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CRAIG ALLEN RAY,
AppellantV.THE STATE OF TEXAS,AppelleeAppeal from the 241st Judicial District Courtof Smith County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 241-0400-10)THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the oral arguments, appellate record and

briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no

error in the judgment.

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below

for observance.