Armando Simon was convicted by a jury of the offense of failing to comply with a sex offender registration requirement. On appeal, Simon challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Officer Michael Allen worked in the sex offender registration unit of the Bexar County Sheriff’s Office when Simon initially reported to register. Officer Allen explained that when a sex offender initially reports to the sheriff’s office, the person completes a prerelease notification form referred to as a CR-32. The form lists the registration requirements with which the sex offender must comply. Officer Allen identified the CR-32 signed by Simon on June 12, 2008, reporting his address as 9515 Flaming Run, Helotes, Texas. Officer Allen also identified a sex offender update form or CR-39 signed by Simon on December 2, 2008, reporting a change of address to 14001 Oak Meadows, #2024, Live Oak, Texas. Finally, Officer Allen identified a second CR-39 signed by Simon on December 9, 2008, reporting a change of address to 9515 Flaming Run, Helotes, Texas. Continue reading
Baldemar Chavera was convicted by a jury of tampering with a governmental record. Chavera filed a motion for new trial, challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. The State appeals the trial court’s order granting Chavera’s motion.
Nora Cruz, a caseworker employed by the Texas Department of Health and Human Services was assigned the food stamp application submitted by Chavera. Cruz had been employed by the Department for thirty-four years and had twenty-four years’ experience as a caseworker. Cruz testified that when she interviews an applicant, she has the applicant’s application present. During the interview, Cruz completes a generic worksheet on her computer. Continue reading
Ausencio Luria appeals his conviction on two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a disabled person, asserting that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict and that the trial court erred in declaring the victim competent to testify. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
On October 17, 2009, R.V., a 19 year-old mentally disabled woman, was being cared for at her aunt Clara Ibarra’s house while R.V.’s mother was at work. R.V.’s uncle Manuel Ibarra was not at home because he was working that day with appellant Luria at Luria’s Mexican restaurant. Luria was known as Alex. When Manuel arrived home later that afternoon, he and Luria stayed outside drinking beer. R.V. came outside to greet them. Luria was married to a cousin of the Ibarra family and had known R.V. since she was a little girl. Luria asked R.V. if she would like to go to his house to see her cousin Alejandra, Luria’s 17 year-old daughter; R.V. replied that she wanted to go. R.V. left with Luria without getting permission from Clara. Instead of going to his house, Luria drove R.V. to his restaurant and took her inside where he sexually assaulted her. Clara became worried about R.V.’s absence and began calling her cell phone and other family members in an effort to track her down. Clara, along with other worried family members, drove over to Luria’s house and found R.V. there. She was crying and had several bruises, or hickies, on her neck which she did not have that morning. The family called the police. The police interviewed R.V. and Luria, and then took R.V., accompanied by her mother, to the hospital for a sexual assault examination. The physical examination showed that R.V. had tears in her vagina and anus. Continue reading
A jury convicted appellant of aggravated assault and sentenced him to confinement for 60 years in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred during the punishment phase by admitting victim-impact and victim-character testimony. Appellant contends the testimony concerned an extraneous offense and was therefore inadmissible.
The complained-of testimony was given by Tashun Thomas. The record reflects that after Thomas was called to the stand, defense counsel asked for a motion in limine on victim impact testimony because Thomas was not the victim in the case being tried. The trial court stated, "I’m going to sustain the victim impact testimony. We can hear about the victim and identification but no victim impact." Continue reading
testing. He contends there is insufficient evidence to sustain the denial of [his] motion
for post-conviction DNA testing under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. [article] 64.03 because
there is no evidence in the record supporting the Trial Court’s conclusion that there is not
a reasonable probability that[,] had the results been available at the time of trial,
This is an appeal about court costs. Appellant Manley DeWayne Johnson pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon, and the trial court sentenced him to seven years in prison. In a single issue on appeal, appellant contends that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s ordering him to pay a particular amount in court costs. We reform the trial court’s judgment to delete the specific amount of costs, and we affirm the judgment as so modified.
In its judgment of conviction, the trial court ordered appellant to pay $234 in court costs. The original clerk’s record filed with this court did not contain a bill of costs. On March 1, 2012, in response to appellant’s motion, we ordered the district clerk to supplement the record with a bill of costs or, in the alternative, provide a certified statement that no such bill exists in the case file. The clerk’s office filed an affidavit in which the affiant averred that the record in this case does not include a bill of costs.
As stated, appellant contends on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support the court costs he was ordered to pay in the judgment. Continue reading
A jury convicted appellant Roger Bridges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and assessed his punishment at fifteen years’ imprisonment. In three issues, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his requests for jury instructions on a lesser included offense and self-defense. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
Appellant stayed away from home all night on December 15, 2010. His wife Peggy was angry, upset, and hurt because appellant did not tell her where he was. When Peggy arrived home after work the next day, appellant was in their living room. Peggy screamed and cursed at him, and he went into the bedroom. Peggy followed him and called him a punk, angering him. Peggy told an officer at the scene that at some point during the altercation, appellant left the room and brought a knife from the kitchen. However, at trial Peggy said that the knife could have been in the bedroom already. Appellant grabbed Peggy by the hair and pulled her along while she was trying to pull away. Some of her hair came out, which left a bald spot. Appellant then grabbed Peggy’s blouse. She pulled back, her blouse tore, and her arm was bruised. Appellant and Peggy fell onto the nightstand, knocking it over, and they both hit the floor. Appellant climbed on top of Peggy and straddled her so she could not get up. Continue reading
marihuana in an amount of two ounces or less. He was sentenced to 180 days in the Hunt County jail and was ordered to pay a $2,000.00 fine. Hughes argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after sustaining an objection to the introduction of evidence related to Hughes’ possession of a firearm. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
engaging in organized criminal activity, and aggravated sexual assault. He was sentenced to life in prison on each count, with counts one and three to be served concurrently and the remaining counts to be served consecutively.
The primary issue is whether the trial court’s improper instruction to the jury, to find that the complainant was a virgin prior to the date of the offense, given orally during the trial without objection, can be reviewed by an appellate court for harmfulness. Continue reading
Appellant has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. Appellant’s counsel has approved the motion. The Court GRANTS the motion and ORDERS that the appeal be DISMISSED and this decision be certified below for observance. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a).
Janelle Mary Henderson has now had her community supervision revoked and has been sentenced to serve time in confinement. Henderson appeals that revocation and sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Henderson’s attorney on appeal has filed a brief that states he has reviewed the record, that sets out the course of the prosecution and revocation proceeding, and that concludes no issues could be raised. Counsel presents and discusses two issues, but has also explained accurately why those issues would not prevail. Counsel has thus provided a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced. This meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); and High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978). Continue reading
A jury found appellant William John Beichner guilty of murder and assessed his punishment at 35 years’ imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. In a single issue, he contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
In October 2010, Beichner and Wanda Kilgore, the complainant, were living together at the Balboa Apartments in Nassau Bay, Texas. They had been living together for about two years. During that time, Nassau Bay police had been dispatched to their residence for domestic violence calls several times. Continue reading